Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a secret way to share keys between legitimate users which is guaranteed by the law of quantum mechanics. Most recently, the limitation of transmission distance without quantum repeaters was broken through by twin-field QKD [Nature (London) 557, 400 (2018)]. Based on its main idea, sending or not-sending (SNS) QKD protocol was proposed [Phys. Rev. A 98, 062323 (2018)], which filled the remaining security loopholes and can tolerate large misalignment errors. In this paper, we give a more general model for SNS QKD, where the two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, can possess asymmetric quantum channels. By applying the method present in the work, the legitimate users can achieve dramatically increased key generation rate and transmission distance compared with utilizing the original symmetric protocol. Therefore, our present work represents a further step along the progress of practical QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), based on the law of quantum mechanics [1] [2] [3] , allows two distant users (Alice and Bob) to establish a string of secure keys despite at the existence of the malicious eavesdropper (Eve). Since the first QKD protocol BB84 [4] came into being, numerous protocols [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] were proposed to promote its development. The goal of QKD is to own high security and long transmission distance simultaneously. To illuminate the relationship between transmittance (η) and key rate (R), R = − log(1 − η) is summarized [10] without quantum repeaters, which are regarded as a solution to overcome the limit of R ∝ O(η). However, due to the restriction of current technology, quantum repeater is far from use [11, 12] . Luckily, twin-field (TF) QKD, based on the single-photon interference, with R ∝ O( √ η) is presented [13] .
TF-QKD inherits the idea of measurement-device independent (MDI) and drastically improves the transmission distance at the same time. Upon its proposal, TF-QKD has been extensively studied [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Among these works, Wang et al. developed a sending or not-sending (SNS) TF-QKD protocol [15] . Without phase announcement for Z basis (signal state), SNS TF-QKD fills the remaining loophole of original TF-QKD. Moreover, due to single-photon interferences only in X basis (decoy states), SNS TF-QKD can tolerate the largest misalignment errors. This protocol seems much more practical for implementations than the original TF-QKD, and its performance has been investigated by considering statistical fluctuation and finite numbers of phase slices [19] .
In real life, most locations of users are not on the symmetry of untrusted third party (UTP). Especially in a multi-user network, UTP can hardly locate at the centre of all users.
One simple solution is to add extra fibers or attenuations at the closer side to compensate the difference between the two transmittances, where original symmetric protocol is certainly suitable. This seems to be a "buckets ef f ect", and the final key rate is limited by the smaller transmittance.
In this work, we develop a general model for the SNS TF-QKD, where the two parties possess asymmetric quantum channels. Different from previous works on asymmetric MDI-QKD [22] [23] [24] , decoy-state method can not applied directly in asymmetric SNS TF-QKD.
According to our analysis, decoy-state method still can be an efficient and secure method in present work only by satisfying some extra constraints.
The paper is organized as follow: In Sec II, we will introduce some basic steps on how to implement asymmetric SNS TF-QKD. Besides, decoy-state method and other theoretical models are given. Corresponding numerical simulations are shown in Sec III. Finally, summaries and outlooks are given out in Sec IV.
II. THE DECOY-STATE ASYMMETRIC SNS TF-QKD
In this section, without adding extra compensation of transmittance, we will show the possibility of applying decoy state asymmetric SNS TF-QKD only by adjusting dependent intensities and other parameters. (1) Alice (Bob) randomly chooses signal window (Z-window) and decoy window (Xwindow) with probability P za (P zb ) and 1 − P za (1 − P zb ). In Z-window, Alice (Bob) de-termines to send a signal state pulse
and not to send with 1 − ε a (1 − ε b ); In X-window, Alice and Bob emit decoy state pulse √ αe iδa+iγa and √ βe iδ b +iγ b , respectively. α ∈ {v a , w a , o}; β ∈ {v b , w b , o}. γ a and γ b are the global phase. Note that, in asymmetric situation, Alice is reasonably assumed to be closer to the UTP than Bob. Then, she should postpone the emission for τ time-windows to ensure the synchronization, i.e, the two states chosen at the same time-windows reach the beam splitter simultaneously.
(2) After the UTP performs the phase compensation with the aid of strong reference light, the two-mode state turns into, for example,
Then the UTP measures the incoming pulses and records the clicking or non-clicking events of the two detectors.
(3)The UTP announces the measurement outcomes after the distribution progress ends.
Then, the users announce for each pulse whether it is a Z-window or an X-window. The intensity and extra phase of X-window should also be public. An efficient event is defined as the following two cases: (a) Alice and Bob both choose Z-windows and only one detector clicking at UTP's side. In this case, four events and the corresponding raw keys are shown in Table I ; (b) Alice and Bob both choose the corresponding intensities in X-window when UTP announces single clicking of detectors, and the phases δ a , δ b should satisfy either of following two inequations:
M is the number of phase slices pre-determine by users. B. Decoy-state method and theoretical models
Before introducing the decoy-state formulae of this protocol, we will review its essence.
In a decoy-state method [5] [6] [7] , legitimate users need to modulate light pulses into different intensities and post-announce the details. Eve can not distinguish which one is the signal state pulse, and can only carry out identical attacking strategies in quantum channels. As a result, the photon-number-splitting attacks will affect the yields, Y n , and QBER, e n which only depend on the numbers of photons n. Whether an eavesdropper exists can be judged from the reasonability of Y n and e n . In essence, decoy state method is based on the following equations:
e n (signal) = e n (decoy).
Now let us come to the asymmetric SNS TF-QKD: Denote Alice and Bob send pulses with intensities x a , x b respectively, and corresponding transmittances are η a , η b (η a > η b ).
For simplicity, we assume that the two detectors at UTP's sides are identical and each with a dark count rate P d and detection efficiency η d individually.
The counting rate of the n-photon states which causes effective events can be written as:
Hereafter, we call the above event as the n-photon effective event. Considering it may possess m photons from Alice and (n − m) photons form Bob, the equivalent photon number distribution can be formulated as:
Correspondingly, the equivalent yield of the n-photon effective event can be expressed as:
where k = is not only dependent on the photon numbers (n), but also related to the ratio (k) of two intensities. Therefore, the original lower bound of the single-photon counting rate (Y 1 ) and upper bound of the single-photon error rate (e 1 ) cannot be applied directly. In the Appendix, we will give corresponding proof for the renewed formulae.
is concerned with the ratio k. For convenience, we denote Y
According to the analysis in the Appendix, for k 1 ≤ k 2 , we can get the lower bound of single-photon yield in X-window
In addition, to estimate the single-photon yield in Z-window, a restriction on the ratio of intensities, e.g.,
≥ k 1 , should be imposed. In this case, the yield in X-window is not larger than the yield in Z-window. Thus, Y L 1 can also be looked as the lower bound in Z-window. Accordingly, the QBER of single-photon pulses is given by [15] :
where e 0 = 0.5.
In real-life implementations, the average counting rate and QBER in X-window can be directly measured. 
After phase post-selection in X-window, |δ a − δ b | are ranging among [0,
Define the system error rate as E sys = 1 2
, where E d is the build-in misalignment error of the optical system. Here E sys comes from single-photon interference and leads to an extra equivalent phase differences between Alice and Bob, denoted as ∆ = arccos(1 − 2E sys ). By integrating, the average gain and quantum-bit errors can be expressed as
Finally, with the above formulae, the key generation rate can be expressed as (12) where Q uau b and E uau b are the average gain and QBER of effective events in Z-window;f is the error correction efficiency;
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
With all the above formulae, we can now carry out numerical simulations for the asymmetric SNS TF-QKD. To be noted, for the asymmetric case, in order to reach the highest visibility of single-photon interference in the UTP's side, certain constraints should be set on the system parameters, to make light from each path possessing the same intensity before the beam-splitter. Statistical fluctuation is also taken into account. For simplicity, we make a Gaussian distribution assumption of the channel fluctuations and apply the standard deviation method, setting the failure probability as 10 −7 [25] . Finite number of phase slices, M, is considered. The experimental parameters used here are taken from Ref. [19] , which are listed out in Table II . Besides, global optimization is applied for a better performance.
In Fig. 2 , L a (L b ) is the distance between Alice (Bob) and the UTP. As mentioned above, by adding extra attenuations, QKD system with asymmetric channels can be transformed into a symmetric one. Hereafter, we call it the original symmetric method. For a vivid per pulse of UTP's detectors respectively; E d is misalignment error of optical system; α is the transmission fiber loss constant; f is the error correction efficiency; N is the number of total pluses. 
APPENDIX
Below, we will give a detailed derivation of Eq. (6). First, to get the monotonicity of Y k n , we make a formula deformation:
Obviously, when η a > η b , Y k n is an increasing function of k. The average gains of the two decoy-states is given by:
When
n holds on. Eq.(15) can be expressed as:
where
n )P n (µ 2 ) ≥ 0. By using the similar method as in Ref. [25] :
Combining Eq. (17) and Eq.(18), we can get: P 2 (µ 1 )Q µ 2 − P 2 (µ 2 )Q µ 1 =[P 2 (µ 1 )P 0 (µ 2 ) − P 2 (µ 2 )P 0 (µ 1 )]Y 0 + [P 2 (µ 1 )P 1 (µ 2 ) − P 2 (µ 2 )P 1 (µ 1 )]Y
Denote P 2 (µ 1 )
n P n (µ 1 ) = ∆ 2 . Due to the weak coherent source satisfying the following condition [25] :
we can conclude that ∆ 2 > 0.
Finally, when k 1 ≤ k 2 , the lower bound of the single-photon yield:
